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μέγας γάρ…ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, 
τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι 
for the struggle to be good rather than bad is important, 
Glaucon, much more important than people think. 
Plato, Republic 10.608b 
παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ᾽ ὅσον 
δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ 
τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε 
ἀγώνων εἶναι 
And I call on all other people as well, as far as I can—and you 
especially I call on in response to your call—to this way of life, 
this contest, that I hold to be worth all the other contests in this 
life. 
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Heather L. Reid, Mark Ralkowski, and Coleen P. Zoller 
Introduction 
Staring back from the modern academy to the world of Classical 
Antiquity, it is easy to forget that the ancient Academy was a gymnasium 
and that Plato was an athlete—a wrestler serious enough to compete at the 
Isthmian Games—before he became a philosopher. The athletic settings, 
techniques and terminology that pepper his work are routinely 
overlooked, lost in translation, or written off as cultural commonplaces 
with little or no philosophical relevance.1 To be sure, agōn was 
characteristic of ancient Greek culture in general,2 but there is something 
special about Plato’s relationship with athletics, gymnastics, and agōn that 
deserves attention from anyone wishing to understand his philosophy. The 
purpose of this book is to explore that relationship from a variety of 
perspectives. The sum of these accounts is far from comprehensive, but we 
hope it will serve as impetus to further study and more serious 
consideration of the agonism inherent in Plato’s philosophy. 
Athletics 
According to Diogenes Laertius (3.1.4), it was his coach, a wrestler 
named Ariston, who gave young Aristocles the nickname Plato, on account 
of his “euexia”—a gymnasium term that would be associated by Aristotle 
not just with good physical condition, but also moral virtue (aretē). The 
same passage confirms Plato’s participation as a wrestler (probably as a 
                                                          
1 Robert Metcalf, Philosophy as Agōn: A Study of Plato’s Gorgias and Related Texts 
(Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 2018) is a recent exception. 
Metcalf argues that Plato’s philosophy is essentially agonistic, and he cites 
Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols §23) as an authoritative precedent for the idea.  
2 A view primarily attributed to Jacob Burckhardt, The Greeks and Greek 
Civilization, ed. Oswyn Murray, trans. Sheila Stern (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1999). For a complete analysis, see Tobias Joho, “Burckhardt and Nietzsche 
on the Agōn: the dark luster of ancient Greece,” in Conflict and Competition: 
Agōn in Western Greece, eds. H. Reid, J. Serrati, and T. Sorg (Sioux City: 
Parnassos Press, 2020), 267-288. Lisa Wilkinson, Socratic Charis: Philosophy 
Without the Agon (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013) challenges the idea, 
arguing that agōn is incompatible with equality, and thus democracy. She 
argues that Plato’s dialogues may be more profitably read as challenging 
agonism. 
boy) in the Panhellenic games at Isthmia.3 Diogenes goes on to describe 
Plato meeting Socrates and beginning to study philosophy at the Academy 
(3.1.5), but we would be wrong to think of this place as a philosophical 
school. In those days it was simply a gymnasium, a parklike space reserved 
for nude exercise (gymnastikē) with little more than shaded paths, open 
areas for wrestling and games, a variety of religious monuments, and easy 
access to water for bathing.4 At the Academy, there is no archaeological 
evidence of a palaistra—the square peristyle building with an open court 
for exercise, exedrae, and undressing rooms, sometimes called a 
gymnasium— until the second half of the fourth century BCE.5 The 
Academy that Plato knew in his youth better resembled the one described 
in Aristophanes’s Clouds: a leafy park where “the plane-tree whispers to 
the elm.”6  
Of course Aristophanes’s Academy is presented as the antithesis of 
Socrates’s “Thinkery,” but it would be rash to suggest that Plato is 
responsible for bringing philosophy into the gymnasium. Not only did 
Socrates, Antisthenes, Prodicus, and various other fifth-century 
intellectuals frequent gymnasia, they were all preceded by the proto-
                                                          
3 Diogenes Laertius 3.1.4: “ἐγυμνάσατο δὲ παρὰ Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Ἀργείῳ 
παλαιστῇ: ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ Πλάτων διὰ τὴν εὐεξίαν μετωνομάσθη, πρότερον 
Ἀριστοκλῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ πάππου καλούμενος [ὄνομα], καθά φησιν 
Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς. ἔνιοι δὲ διὰ τὴν πλατύτητα τῆς ἑρμηνείας 
οὕτως ὀνομασθῆναι: ἢ ὅτι πλατὺς ἦν τὸ μέτωπον, ὥς φησι Νεάνθης. εἰσὶ 
δ᾽ οἳ καὶ παλαῖσαί φασιν αὐτὸν Ἰσθμοῖ, καθὰ καὶ Δικαίαρχος ἐν πρώτῳ 
Περὶ βίων.” 
4 On Greek gymnasia, see Jean Delorme, Gymnasion: Etude sur les Monuments 
Consacres a l’Education en Grece (Paris: Editions e. de Boccard, 1960). 
5 That is, decades after Plato’s school was inaugurated around 387 BCE. 
According to Delorme, Gymnasion, 325-329, the philosophical school at the 
Academy ultimately consisted of the garden, the house, the mouseion, and 
the exedra—which was probably built as a place to give lessons to the 
ephebes. For the archaeology of the Academy, see Ada Caruso, Akademia: 
Archeologia di una scuola filosofica ad Atene da Platone a Proclo (Athens-
Paestum: Scuola Archaeological Italiana di Atene, 2013), esp. 96-106. 
6 Aristophanes, Clouds, trans. Jeffrey Henderson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 1005-1008. The comedy was first performed in 423 
BCE, when Plato would have been a young child.  
philosopher Pythagoras.7 Diogenes Laertius reports that in 588 BCE, the 
Olympic boxing crown was won by a Samian youth named Pythagoras, 
who triumphed by fighting “scientifically” despite having to compete 
against the men.8 Like so many stories about Pythagoras, this one about 
Olympic victory is doubted, but the philosopher’s connection to athletics 
appears credible.9 He was indisputably connected to Croton, a city noted 
for its dominance in the Olympic Games; and sources report a relationship 
with the city’s famed wrestler Milo.10 Many of Plato’s ideas have roots in 
Pythagoreanism, perhaps even his decision to teach in a gymnasium—an 
act that followed his first trip to Western Greece, where athletics and 
                                                          
7 In addition to Plato, Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1.1.10, attests to Socrates’s habitual 
gymnasium visits. The Socratic Antisthenes (ca. 444-ca. 365 BCE) was said 
by Diogenes Laertius (6.10.13) to converse (dialegetai) in the Cynosarges 
gymnasium. Evidence for Prodicus’s presence in gymnasia comes from the 
pseudo-Platonic dialogue the Eryxias (399a-b), where the sophist is said to 
have been expelled from the Lyceum by the gymnasiarch for expressing 
dangerous views before a youthful audience. 
8 Diogenes Laertius (8.47): “Ἐρατοσθένης δέ φησι, καθὸ καὶ Φαβωρῖνος ἐν τῇ 
ὀγδόῃ Παντοδαπῆς ἱστορίας παρατίθεται, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον 
ἐντέχνως πυκτεύσαντα ἐπὶ τῆς ὀγδόης καὶ τετταρακοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος, 
κομήτην καὶ ἁλουργίδα φοροῦντα: ἐκκριθέντα τ᾽ ἐκ τῶν παίδων καὶ 
χλευασθέντα αὐτίκα προσβῆναι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ νικῆσαι.” 
9 This is the conclusion of Nigel Spivey, “Pythagoras and the Origins of Olympic 
Ideology,” in Barbara Goff and Michael Simpson, eds. Thinking the Olympics 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 21-39. Pythagoras’s biographer Porphyry (15) 
reports that “Pythagoras trained the Samian athlete Eurymenes, who 
though he was of small stature, conquered at Olympia through his 
surpassing knowledge of Pythagoras' wisdom.” The trainer story is denied 
by the more reliable biographer Iamblichus (25), but he nevertheless affirms 
that Pythagoras recruited athletes in Samos’s gymnasia (21) and went to the 
gymnasium in Croton as soon as he arrived (37). Iamblichus also relates that 
Pythagoreans were subject to a battery of tests (dokimasia), including their 
physical aspect (eidos), gait (poreia) and ‘mobility’ (kinēsis) (71). 
10 Milo’s connections to Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism, including his marriage 
to Pythagoras’s daughter, Myia, are explained in detail by J-M Roubineau, 
Milon de Crotone ou l’invention de sport (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2016). An English review of the book by Heather L. Reid appears in 
Classical Review 67.2 (2017): 457-9. 
Pythagoreanism were prominent.11 Like Pythagoras, Plato believed that 
philosophy is not a skill, a profession, or even a subject of study, but rather 
a way of life that involves habituation or training (ethos), including daily 
exercise, and regular testing, which may take the form of athletic contest.12 
We should not imagine that Plato himself, or any of his students, had 
Olympic victory as their goal. Athletics had become “professionalized” 
since Pythagoras’s day, and both Republic and Laws criticize the intense 
training required as an impediment to the pursuit of aretē.13 He clearly sees 
value in competition, however, for men, women, children, and the 
community itself. In Laws, athletic festivals are to be held every month, and 
everyone in the community, including women and children, is 
encouraged—if not required—to compete.14 Events include footraces 
ranging from 200 to 20,000 meters, almost all of them in armor (832e), as 
well as ballgames (830e), single and team combat events (833e), as well as 
armed equestrian events (834c). The function is partly martial: “if it helps 
us to train for war we must go in for it and put up prizes for the winners, 
but leave it strictly alone if it does not” (832e).15 Ultimately, however, the 
goal of athletic contests in Laws is to preserve the “ways of virtue” (agathon) 
and to avoid injustice (adikein) from oneself and others (829ab). In his own 
life and in the ways of life he describes in his work, athletics has a role, but 
aretē is always the goal. 
                                                          
11 That Plato met with several Pythagoreans, especially Archytas or Taretum, on 
his trip west is attested by a variety of ancient sources, including the Seventh 
Letter. For an overview of the topic, see Heather Reid and Mark Ralkowski, 
eds., Plato at Syracuse with a new translation of the Seventh Letter by Jonah 
Radding (Sioux City: Parnassos Press, 2019). 
12 That Pythagoras thought this is attested by Aristotle (Fr. 195). Plato describes 
philosophy as a way of life at Repuplic 600ab. 
13 Republic 404a, Laws 807c. Ruobineau, Milon de Crotone, argues credibly that the 
Pythagorean Milo was the first truly professional athlete. 
14 The festivals are discussed in Laws VIII. The text wavers on whether 
participation will be mandatory for everyone at all times, but clearly 
emphasizes that the rules will apply to men and women alike (829e). See H. 
Reid, “Plato on Women in Sport,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 47:3 
(2020): 1-18.  
15 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Plato are from Plato, Complete Works, 
eds. John M, Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
Gymnastics 
Athletic training and contests in an explicitly educational context are 
best described as gymnastics. Athletic contests and horse races (as well as 
dancing and hunting) are called gymnastikē at Republic 412b, not because 
they weren’t part of the games, but because they were aimed at cultivating 
aretē.16 Combining philosophy and gymnastics in education was not a new 
idea,17 but most people thought the latter served only the body. Plato’s 
Socrates explicitly rejects that idea at Republic 410c, saying, instead, that 
both gymnastikē and mousikē were established “chiefly for the sake of the 
soul.” Gymnastics, in particular, is useful for harmonizing the spirited and 
wisdom-loving parts of the soul (411e). In other words, it promotes aretē, 
which is understood as a kind of health and harmony in the soul, which, 
like bodily health, requires exercise.18 Since Plato believed that the soul is 
the origin of human movement,19 he concluded that moving the body can 
actually train the soul. Socrates states explicitly that a fit body does not 
produce virtue in the soul, but rather that the soul’s aretē makes the body 
as good as possible (Republic 403d). Performance in athletic contests is, 
accordingly, an indicator of healthy souls, and it is used in Republic to select 
who will receive higher education and become philosopher-rulers 
(537bc).20  
                                                          
16 On the goals of gymnastic education in Plato’s Republic, see Heather L Reid, 
“Sport as Moral Education in Plato’s Republic,” Journal of the Philosophy of 
Sport 34:2 (2007): 160-175; and “Plato’s Gymnasium,” in Athletics and 
Philosophy in the Ancient World: Contests of Virtue (London: Routledge, 2011) 
56-68. Plato’s focus on the soul, rather than the body, may be part of the 
reason that he promotes gymnastic education for women just as much as 
men in both Republic and Laws; for an analysis, see Heather L. Reid, “Plato 
on Women in Sport,” Journal of the Philosophy of sport 47:3 (2020): 1-18. 
17 Isocrates, Antidosis, 182 declares that philosophy and gymnastics are “twin 
arts—parallel and complementary—by which their masters prepare the 
mind to become more intelligent and the body to become more serviceable, 
not separating sharply the two kinds of education, but using similar 
methods of instruction, exercise, and other forms of discipline.” 
18 Plato uses the virtue-as-health analogy in many dialogues, for example Republic 
444d-e. 
19 A common view in ancient Greece, see Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind in 
Greek Philosophy and Literature (New York: Dover, 1982), 8–22. 
20 Plato does not say that only the winners of the contests would be selected; he 
simply implies that the contests will test their mettle, so to speak, “more 
The goal of Platonic gymnastics, as we said, is not Olympic victory, 
but rather to acquire what Socrates calls a “helper for philosophy” (498b); 
and by this he means a psychic state rather than a physical one. He seems 
to think that the kind of character that remains resolute in the face of 
temptation and adversity in sport will have what is needed to 
take the longer road and put as much effort into learning as into 
physical training, for otherwise, as we were just saying, he will 
never reach the goal of the most important subject and the most 
appropriate one for him to learn.” (504cd) 
“People’s souls give up much more easily in hard study than in physical 
training,” explains Socrates; they need a love for hard work (philoponon) 
that can be directed at learning, listening, and inquiry just as much as 
gymnastikē (535b-d). In Republic’s educational theory, the competitive spirit 
cultivated through sport is eventually applied to philosophical argument 
(539d). That something similar was probably practiced in Plato’s Academy 
is suggested by the dialogues themselves. 
The real-life competition between Plato and his rival educators helps 
to explain his dialogues’ agonism. Plato had a professional interest in 
pitting Socrates against rival sophists,21 or, more specifically, the sophistic 
understanding of education.22 For Plato, aretē is not something that can be 
                                                          
thoroughly than gold is tested by fire” (413cd). The testing of gold metaphor 
is repeated a bit later, “We said, if you remember, that they must show 
themselves to be lovers of their city when tested by pleasure and pain and 
that they must hold on to their resolve through labors, fears, and all other 
adversities. Anyone incapable of doing so was to be rejected, while anyone 
who came through unchanged—like gold tested in a fire—was to be made 
ruler and receive prizes [athla] both while he lived and after his death” 
(Republic 502d–503a). 
21 We use the word ‘sophist’ here in a stipulative way to identify Plato’s 
philosophical rivals. In fact, the distinction between sophist and philosopher 
was not so clear-cut in fifth and fourth century BCE Athens. See John 
Patrick Lynch, Aristotle’s School (Berkeley: University of California Press 
1972), 41. In a letter from the late second or early 3rd century BCE, 
Philostratus (Epistles, 1.73) tells Julia Domna that Plato is not so different 
from the sophists and has, in fact, borrowed some of their tricks.  
22 For a comparison of sophistic and Socratic education, see Coleen P. Zoller, “To 
‘Graze Freely in the Pastures of Philosophy’: The Political Motives and 
bought and sold, it must be earned through training and competition. So 
when sophists like Protagoras claim to teach aretē for a fee, he sends 
Socrates in to strip them bare and expose the fraud.23 The attempt to 
commercialize aretē, among gymnastic and sophistic educators alike, 
corrupts the process of pursuing it. It tends to value external appearance 
over internal excellence, or to confuse the trappings of victory with the 
virtue that gives victory value in the first place. Sophists like Isocrates, who 
habitually confuse aretē with practical (especially rhetorical) skill because 
it is “recognized by all” (Antidosis 84), run afoul not only of Platonic 
metaphysics, which posits universal ideals, but also ancient Olympic 
values, which rewarded victors with only a sacred wreath of vegetation.  
Platonic gymnastics orients the agōn toward aretē, replacing the love of 
victory (philonikia) with the love of wisdom (philosophia). It is no 
coincidence that in Plato’s Apology, Socrates chastises Meletus for 
carelessly and ambitiously bringing people to court, literally eis agōna—
into the contest (24c). The competitive spirit of sophists, social climbers, 
and perhaps even athletes, needed to be directed toward a higher good. 
Agōn 
Plato routinely describes Socratic dialogue in agonistic terms. In 
Euthydemus, the argument is compared to a ball game (277b) and wrestling 
match (277d, 278b, 288a). In Protagoras, it is called a verbal contest (agōna 
logōn), and Socrates compares Protagoras to the champion runner Krison 
                                                          
Pedagogical Methods of Socrates and the Sophists,” Polis 27; 1 (2010): 80-
110. 
23 Protagoras (313c-d): “Then can it be, Hippocrates, that the sophist is really a sort 
of merchant or dealer (kapēlos) in provisions on which a soul is nourished? 
For such is the view I take of him […] And we must take care, my good 
friend, that the sophist, in commending his wares, does not deceive us, as 
both merchant and dealer (kapēlos) do in the case of our bodily food. For 
among the provisions, you know, in which these men deal, not only are they 
themselves ignorant what is good or bad for the body, since in selling they 
commend them all, but the people who buy from them are so too, unless 
one happens to be a trainer or a doctor. And in the same way, those who 
take their lessons (mathēmata) the round of our cities, hawking (kapēleuontes) 
them about to any odd purchaser who desires them, commend everything 
that they sell, and there may well be some of these too, my good sir, who are 
ignorant which of their wares is good or bad for the soul.” W.R.M. Lamb, 
trans., Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967). 
of Himera (335e). In Theaetetus, Socrates is compared to Antaeus, a 
mythological athlete who lived in a cave and forced passers-by to wrestle 
him (169b). At Philebus 41b, Socrates says: “So let us get ready like athletes 
to form a line of attack around his problem,” and in Cratylus, he says “once 
we’re in the competition, we’re allowed no excuses” (421d). Socrates’s 
opponents even suggest that he is too competitive. “You love to win, 
Socrates,” says Callicles (Gorgias 515b). Observes Protagoras, “I think that 
you just want to win the argument, Socrates” (360e). Thrasymachus 
accuses the philosopher of competitiveness and love of honor (Republic 
336c), adding “without trickery you’ll never be able to overpower me in 
argument” (341b).  
But the method of Plato’s Socrates is not a zero-sum game. Socrates 
responds to Callicles’s charge of philonikia by saying, “it’s not for love of 
winning that I’m asking you. It’s rather because I really do want to know” 
(Gorgias 515b). To Protagoras, he replies, “I have no other reason for asking 
these things than my desire to answer these questions about virtue (aretē),” 
especially what it is and whether it can be taught (361a). This contrasts with 
the sophists’ approach, which he criticizes in Euthydemus for confusing the 
defeat of their opponents with the achievement of wisdom: “They think 
that if they place these persons in the position of appearing to be worth 
nothing, then victory in the contest for the reputation of wisdom will be 
indisputably and immediately theirs, and in the eyes of all” (305d). But this 
kind of victory amounts to settling for plausibility rather than truth, says 
Socrates; it confuses the reputation for wisdom with wisdom itself. One is 
reminded of the ancient Sicilian wrestler Leontiskos, who won matches not 
with wrestling skill, but by breaking his opponents’ fingers.24 The problem 
with victories won through trickery, whether athletic or eristic, is that they 
subvert the ultimate purpose of the contest, which is aretē—for both 
opponents. Enlightened athletes and Socratic philosophers recognize this 
and come to regard agonistic struggle as mutually beneficial; their 
philonikia becomes philosophia. 
When Critias accuses Socrates of trying to refute him rather than 
address the “real question at issue,” Socrates demurs, claiming that he is 
“examining the argument for my own sake primarily, but perhaps also for 
the sake of my friends” (Charmides 166d). Once Critias agrees that such 
clarification of concepts is part of the common good, Socrates tells him to 
                                                          
24 The story is told in Pausanias, Description of Greece, 6.4.3. 
ignore who is being refuted and instead to “give your attention to the 
argument itself” (Charmides 166e). He reminds his interlocutor Protarchus 
that “we are not contending here out of love of victory for my suggestion 
to win or yours. We ought to act together as allies in support of the truest 
one” (Philebus 14b). He tells Polus that friends must help each other up 
when they fall (Gorgias 462c), and when the sophist complains he is hard 
to refute, Socrates responds that he himself would be grateful to be refuted: 
“Please don’t falter now in doing a friend a good turn,” he says, “Refute 
me” (470cd). Socrates believes in providing an agonistic challenge even to 
one’s beloved, as evidenced not only by his treatment of his own eromenoi, 
but also in the advice he gives to erastes.25 Enlightened agonism, inspired 
by the athletic model of the heroes, is for Socrates the ultimate form of 
friendship. As he explains to Theodorus,  
I have met with many a Heracles and Theseus in my time, mighty 
men of words; and they have well battered me. But for all that I 
don’t retire from the field, so terrible a lust has come upon me for 
these exercises. You must not begrudge me this either, try a fall 
with me and we shall both be the better. (Theaetetus 169bc) 
Essays 
The essays in this volume address several aspects of agōn in Plato’s 
dialogues, from their dramatic setting and characters, to their methods, 
metaphors, and goals. Heather L. Reid opens the discussion by arguing 
that Plato’s dialogues not only employ athletic settings and metaphors, 
some of them actually function as virtual gymnasia, presenting Socrates as 
a coach who guides readers—as well as interlocutors—toward an 
innovative ideal of aretē. Matthew P. Evans’s essay examines the interplay 
between Plato’s philosophy and the architecture of the athletic buildings 
in which he sets Lysis, Charmides, Euthydemus, and Theaetetus. Evans argues 
that Plato encodes philosophical meaning into these spaces, thus 
reinforcing the power of his dialogues. Understanding the structure and 
function of gymnastic spaces in Plato’s time can enhance our 
understanding of his meaning. Next, Erik Kenyon analyzes the interaction 
of dramatic and philosophical agōn in Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, 
revealing how all of these layers of competition aim ultimately to promote 
virtue. These dialogues, set in or around wrestling schools, use care for the 
body as a framework for thinking about care for the soul. 
                                                          
25 See for example, Lysis, 210e. 
Christopher Moore’s essay examines the character of Critias in the 
Protagoras. On the one hand, Critias serves as a negative example of one 
who fails to enter the philosophical agōn by subjecting his views to the 
scrutiny of others, and lacks self-knowledge because of it. On the other 
hand, as an opponent of Socrates, he contributes constructively to the 
debate by nudging it toward a higher moral plane. Moore surmises that 
the historical Critias may have performed a similar role. Mark Ralkowski 
also examines a character, this time Alcibiades, in whom he sees the 
embodiment of an agōn between two ways of life in fifth c. BCE Athens. 
The battle is between the life of philosophy and that of politics, and the fact 
that Socrates lost Alcibiades to the latter is more an indictment of Athenian 
politics than of Socratic method.  
Next, Stamatia Dova takes a philological approach to Plato’s interest 
in gymnastikē, analyzing his use of philogymnastia and its cognates in several 
dialogues. In contrast to the assumption that Plato is an unabashed sports 
enthusiast, she argues that he thinks love of exercise can be a help or a 
hindrance to the philosophical life; it all depends on balance and measure. 
The longstanding agōn between philosophy and poetry as played out in the 
Republic is the subject of Guilherme Domingues da Motta’s essay. He 
argues that Plato’s opponents in this struggle are not only the poets, but 
also the (mis)interpreters of poetry, as represented by Glaucon’s and 
Adeimantus’s misleading speeches. Philosophy is the remedy to the abuse 
of poetry, not to poetry itself. Then, Marie-Élise Zovko’s essay unravels the 
interlocking tapestry of agōnes in the Symposium. Set on the occasion of a 
dramatic contest, the contest of speeches constructs a deeper agōn between 
a human and a divine ideal of erōs. Zovko argues that the Symposium pits 
traditional Dionysian cult against a new form of erotic cult represented by 
Diotima. 
A group of papers on method begins with Nicholas D. Smith arguing 
that Plato’s Socrates uses shame agonistically, to push interlocutors 
emotionally toward rationally defensible beliefs. He says this process is 
compatible with Socratic “intellectualism” since it prepares people for 
rational decision-making while they are still subject to their emotions. 
Next, Jure Zovko argues that Socratic elenchos is fundamentally agonal in 
its structure and character, not just in the so-called early dialogues, but 
right through to Plato’s later works. The dialectical analysis of language 
can teach us much about the good life, but to actually live it we need the 
kind of reasonable judgment that is cultivated through agōn. Gymnastic 
training inspires philosophical method in Parmenides, according to Lidia 
Palumbo and Heather L. Reid. They argue that the dialectical method 
called gymnasia in that dialogue not only resembles athletic training, it 
invites readers to wrestle with the relationship between universals and 
particulars.  
That Socratic method can’t be separated from its goals is demonstrated 
by the final set of essays. Daniel A. Dombrowski’s article analyzes the four-
term analogies in the Gorgias: beautification : gymnastics :: cookery : 
medicine, and sophistic : legislation :: rhetoric : justice. Emphasizing Plato’s 
hylomorphism, Dombrowski concludes that the athletic life and the 
intellectual life in Platonic philosophy amount to the same thing. The key 
distinction is between “flattery arts” that seek pleasure and those, like 
gymnastics, that seek the good. Next, Lee M. J. Coulson contrasts the 
agonism inherent in sophistic eristic with that of Platonic dialectic. He 
claims that eristic aims arrogantly at triumph while dialectic aims at noble 
victory, noting that the latter precludes the former. In the concluding essay, 
Coleen P. Zoller argues that Plato’s agonism does not imply acceptance of 
a logic of domination. He rejects the pleonectic approach of interlocutors 
like Thrasymachus and Callicles, and promotes a meritocratic hierarchy 
aimed at fostering goodness, harmony, and peace for all. Commentators 
who overlook this aspect of Plato’s agonism, may have an impoverished 
understanding of agōn itself.  
On the whole, these chapters show that the concept of agōn was central 
to Plato’s thinking about philosophy: its method and aims, its people and 
places, and especially its rivalry with competing ways of life. If the 
contributors to this volume are correct, Plato’s views throughout his career 
were shaped by his early years as a competitive wrestler. He saw a family 
resemblance between caring for the body and caring for the soul, and he 
saw the struggle of competition in every dimension of life in the polis. This 
struggle occurred in each person’s soul, and it happened in the city as a 
whole, in a competition between ways of living. There was no greater 
contest in life, and Socrates invited all of us to take it up for ourselves 
(Gorgias 526e).  
